This paper summarizes recent developments in the theory and practice of monetary policy in a closed economy and explains what these developments mean for United States dollar policy. There is no conflict between what is appropriate U.S. monetary policy at home or abroad because the dollar is the world's key currency. Both at home and abroad, the main problem for U.S. policymakers is to provide an anchor for the dollar. Recent experience in other countries suggests that a solution is evolving in the use of inflation targets.
Introduction: Why Should Americans Care about the Dollar?
People in the United States do not pay much attention to the foreign sector-at least relative to the amount of attention paid in other countries. Typically, textbooks suggest that this is because we are not as open as other countries-defining openness as the size of imports and exports relative to gross domestic product (GDP). That may be right, but a better explanation is that monetary policy made in the United States matters for other nations much more than their policy matters for the United States. Being the largest economy and the key currency country, the U.S. dollar is the de facto numéraire for most transactions involving trade with the United States and a significant share of trade between other countries.
The only times U.S. policymakers seem to care about the foreign exchange value of the dollar is when the dollar moves in extreme fashion: when it falls as it did in the 1960s and 1970s (see Mayer 1980) or, for example, when the high value of the dollar led Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to disregard the flawed signal that he was receiving from the M1 target in early 1985.
The same attitude is evident in the Fed's resistance to inflation targeting. There is an evolving consensus that central banks ought to anchor monetary policy with ongoing inflation targets. Explicit inflation targets have been most useful in countries that already have achieved some degree of price stability. Whether intended or accidental, the advantage of explicit inflation targeting seems to be that the public comes to believe that the target is a long-run objective.
1 Inflation targeting helps to increase credibility about long-run objectives. Outside the United States, threats to credibility are reflected most sharply in the foreign exchange markets.
The Link between Domestic Monetary Policy and Foreign Exchange Policy
Because the United States is the world's key currency country, uncertainty about the long-run value of the dollar becomes evident to us only when it becomes extreme.
The bond market has been an important restraint on Fed policy, but the foreign exchange market has not. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) use interest rates on indexed and comparable non-indexed bonds to show that macroeconomic news affects the expected inflation premium in long-term U.S. interest rates. This is evidence that markets continually must update their expectations about what the Fed's goal of price stability means in terms of the consumer price index (CPI) 10 years from now. This effect of macroeconomic news on long-term inflation expectations disappeared in the United Kingdom in the period after 1997-after the Bank of England had enjoyed some success with inflation targeting and also was given the authority (previously held by the U.K.
Treasury) to make short-run decisions about the money market interest rate.
In Gavin (2004) , I report that the individual forecasts of one-to two-years-ahead CPI are more dispersed in the United States and Japan than they are in the inflationtargeting countries. I also note that in the United States there is more disagreement among Fed policymakers in their forecasts of 18-months-ahead inflation than there is in their forecasts of real GDP.
The appropriate U.S. foreign exchange policy also is appropriate U.S. domestic monetary policy. That is, the Fed (with the consensus of Congress and the administration in power) should adopt an explicit numerical objective for the long-run trend in the CPI.
Personally, I recommend zero inflation as the target. If the dollar is going to anchor the international monetary system, then, at least in principle, it should be convertible into a fixed-quantity basket of goods available in the United States.
Inflation Targeting and the International Monetary System
The past 25 years have seen a major advance in our understanding of how to manage paper currency. Things we have learned include:
• The main channel for monetary transmission is the expectations channel.
•
Operating with an interest rate instrument is a form of inflation targeting.
Monetary policy can be defined as having two instruments-the long-term price objective and the short-term liquidity position.
The class of optimal policies is characterized by credible long-run price stability, which eliminates a source of asset pricing bubbles and self-fulfilling deflations and creates flexibility for short-run policies.
• Inflation targeting works because the public perceives inflation targets as long-run objectives.
• Inflation targeting has been adopted in countries where governments reject using seigniorage to close the government budget gap and where the Phillips curve is no longer seen as a useful framework for making monetary policy.
2

The Expectations Channel
2 The Phillips curve relationship may be useful in monitoring inflation pressures even if it is not a structural framework for policymaking. Evidence on forecasting role is mixed (see Stock and Watson, 2005) .
Inflation targeting works because the expectations channel is the main mechanism through which central banks affect the price level and the economy. That inflation targeting has been so widely adopted and apparently worked so well has been a bit of a surprise to the monetarists who struggled first to sell monetary targeting and then to explain why it did not work. The usual explanation was simply that the central banks could not get control of monetary aggregates right. Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005) show that interest rate stabilization policies are more important than allegedly "sticky prices" for explaining the persistence of inflation.
Many people do not realize that when the Fed switched temporarily from pure interest rate targeting to the non-borrowed reserve operating procedure in October 1979, observed variances in monthly CPI figures after the switch tended to mirror the variances of nominal interest rates (see Cogley and Sargent 2005) .
The Instruments of Monetary Policy
To understand why inflation targeting works so well, it is useful to think about monetary policy as having two uncorrelated, but not independent, instruments. One is the long-term price objective, and the other is the short-term liquidity position. The two are not independent because, in the long run, the accumulation of reserves growth from setting short-run liquidity positions (from open market operations) must be consistent with the long-term price objective. But the two can be uncorrelated in the short run, just as tax receipts and government spending appear to be uncorrelated over short time horizons.
The most important of these instruments is the long-term price objective, but it should almost never change. If policy is appropriate, people will hardly be aware of it as a policy. The focus will be on the short-run liquidity decisions (short-run changes in the federal funds target) because setting the federal funds rate target depends on incoming data and knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. In Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005), we show how the analysis of monetary policy depends on whether one views monetary policy as having a transitory effect on liquidity or as having a long-lasting effect on the inflation trend. Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) show that unexpected shocks to the federal funds target have been highly persistent. Such persistence most likely is caused by minor, but nearly permanent, shifts in perceptions about the Fed's long-run inflation objective.
The Optimal Monetary Policy Objective Is Price Stability
To understand the role of monetary policy objectives, we leave the Arrow-Debreu world of complete markets and perfect information. The role of policy objectives always is to eliminate the distortions caused by departures from the assumptions of a perfect world underlying monetary policy analysis. In the case of costly price adjustments, the best thing that the central bank can do is to eliminate unnecessary changes in the price level. In the consensus New Keynesian model of Woodford (2003) , the optimal policy objective is a stable price level.
A credible price stability objective affects the environment in which short-run policy is made. It changes the environment in two important ways. First, it eliminates an important source of indeterminacy in economic models. Whether it does so in the actual economy is a debatable issue, but there is no doubt that, in models, leaving the long-run price objective uncertain increases the likelihood of asset pricing bubbles and selffulfilling prophesies of deflation.
Second, a credible long-run policy objective creates flexibility for pursuing alternative short-run goals. One of the results clearly established in the literature since 1994 is that the short-run volatility of both output and inflation can be reduced if the central bank is committed to a path for the price level (or, equivalently, a long-run inflation objective). The only exception to this result is in models where most agents are backward-looking (that is, they ignore information about expected changes in policy).
Even there, the aggregate welfare losses associated with backward-looking behavior are an important policy problem. The best thing the central bank can do in this case is to encourage forward-looking behavior by being clear about the inflation objective and following systematic procedures to achieve it.
Optimal monetary policy in an open economy is still very much a frontier issue for economic research. In practice, I suspect that following inflation targeting strategies already has led central banks to coordinate in ways that approximate good, if not optimal, policies. Inflation targeting has led countries to adopt converging targets for inflation that are quite low. To the extent that they eliminate inflation in their traded goods sectors, they make nominal exchange rate fluctuations reflect real values.
Inflation Targeting Works
I was somewhat surprised to learn that the general adoption of inflation targeting among the industrial economy central banks has given the general public the impression that the targeted inflation rates are long-run objectives. One reason for this public assumption is the central banks' practice of choosing the same inflation target rate year in and year out. For whatever reason, inflation forecasts for all time horizons tend to become centered on the central bank's target. King (1999) argued that the Bank of Inflation targeting as a long-run rule for price stability is at odds with oldfashioned adaptive expectation models. The decisions by New Zealand to adopt an inflation target and by the European countries to join the European Central Bank (and thus implicitly to adopt a common inflation target) were opposed largely by two groups.
One was macroeconomists who continue, even today, to imagine that the Phillips curve is a legitimate framework for conducting monetary policy. The other was a surprisingly resilient group of economists who continue to believe that a policy of long-run price stability necessarily leads to permanently high unemployment.
Conclusion
The principal modern problem in foreign exchange policy is how to create a price stability anchor for a paper currency. I suggest that a solution is evolving in the use of inflation targets. In its pure mathematical form, as a short-run rule for guiding daily open market operations with period-by-period targets, inflation targeting is a bad idea and performs poorly as a nominal anchor. If, instead, inflation targeting were seen as a long-run objective for the average inflation rate, it would become a predetermined path for the price level. In theory, this is a great idea and is similar to the plan for a compensated dollar recommended by Irving Fisher nearly a century ago.
